A Role for Sunspots in Explaining Endogenous Fluctutations in Illegal Immigration by Guzman, Mark G. et al.
A Role for Sunspots in Explaining Endogenous
Fluctutations in Illegal Immigration1
Mark G. Guzman
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Joseph H. Haslag
Department of Economics
University of Missouri
Pia M. Orrenius
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
September 26, 2003
1We would like to thank Scott Dressler for his diligent research assistance and Todd Keister and
Erwan Quintin for their helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do
not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System. All
errors and omissions are the authors alone.
Abstract
In this paper we provide an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit
substantial uctuations despite a constant wage gap. We develop a model economy in which
migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border enforcement and lump-sum transfers
from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic in nature, a sunspot, and arises as
a result of ambiguity regarding the commodity price of money. Migrants are restricted
from participating in state-contingent insurance markets in the host country, whereas host
country natives are not. We establish the existence of sunspot equilibria that are not mere
randomizations over certainty equilibria. Volatility in migration ows stems from two distinct
sources: the tension between transfers inducing migration and enforcement discouraging it
and secondly the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the impact of a change in
tax/transfer policies by the government on migration.
1 Introduction
Many developed countries are dealing with the issue of limiting immigration ows, espe-
cially undocumented immigrants that bypass government mechanisms designed to control
the immigrants entry, duration of stay, and work authorization. The recent rise in illegal
immigration has led economic researchers to seek out a cogent theoretical explanation that
accounts for changing migration patterns. One puzzle, at least for neoclassical theory (see
Todaro (1969)), is the considerable evidence that migration often increases in the face of
constant or diminishing wage gaps.
One methodology for explaining uctuations in migration, despite constant wage di¤eren-
tials, has been to explicitly model network externalities.1 Networks induce agents to migrate
by reducing the transactions costs associated with moving. While the marginal benets in
the form of wage di¤erentials are unchanged, the marginal costs associated with moving are
reduced  resulting in greater migration. However, a major drawback to this literature
is that while networks can explain increasing migration, they typically cannot account for
falling, or even stable, migration ows.
In this paper we o¤er an alternative explanation which examines economic variables that
impact both the marginal costs and benets of migration. As with the network externality
literature, we emphasize the role of non-wage factors to account for uctuations in illegal
immigration. Specically, we focus on the role of government transfers and border enforce-
ment as primary forces a¤ecting uctuations in migration over time. Governments, like the
US, have used these policy instruments (border enforcement and transfers to immigrants)
to stem rising illegal immigration in recent years. Fluctuations arise as a result of both the
tension existing between enforcement and transfers (as factors discouraging, encouraging mi-
gration respectively) and because there is extrinsic uncertainty, sunspots, regarding the real
value of nominal taxes and transfers. As a result of the sunspot, not only do the values of
government transfers and taxes vary, but also the resources devoted to border enforcement.
Sunspots have been used to study endogenous uctuations in other literatures. Most
notably, a literature has developed that seeks to explain business cycle uctuations.2 Figure
1For recent literature in this vein, see Carrington et al. (1996), Stark and Wang (2002), and Taylor (1986).
2See, for instance, Azariadas and Guesnerie (1986), Woodford (1987), Farmer and Guo (1994), Farmer
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1 plots the detrended (log) levels of apprehensions by the U. S. border patrol.3 As this
gure illustrates, the volatility in apprehensions is much greater than volatility in output,
as measured by GDP. Indeed, the standard deviation in output is 0.84% between 1991 and
2002 while the standard deviation of total apprehensions is 14.6%. Insofar as endogenous
uctuations can explain observed volatility in output, they are also a possible explanation
for observed volatility in illegal immigration ows.
Our goal in this paper is two-fold. First, we seek to develop a sunspot based immigration
model, characterized by real world entities such as people smugglers and border patrols,
which can also account for uctuations in migration ows (both increases and decreases)
over time. Second, we wish to explore the impact of changes in policy instruments on the
levels of illegal immigration and smuggler usage
Our analysis builds on the methods developed in Bhattacharya et al. (1998), henceforth
BGS.4 In that paper, the authors derive conditions under which stationary sunspot equilibria
are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria, and thus, sunspots matter in a ma-
terial sense. Our paper closely follows the methodology of BGS, except for which groups of
individuals have access to insurance markets. In our model, there is a naturalrestriction
in which individuals not born in the host country do not have access to the state-contingent
insurance markets available to host-country workers: although these restricted individuals
are still assumed to be born after the state of nature is revealed.
The basic structure of the economy is as follows. Individuals are born in either of two
countries, hereafter designated as the home country and the host country. For simplicity, we
assume that only some individuals from the home country migrate. Host-country individuals
are divided into skilled and unskilled workers. Both sets of individuals supply labor, earn
wages, pay taxes, and consume. The nominal value of taxes is known, while the goods value
is not  due to uncertainty regarding the price level. Individuals born in the host country
and Woodford (1997), and Benhabib and Kazuo (1998) for examples of model economies in which sunspots
are o¤ered as a possible explanation for the volatility observed in real GDP at business cycle frequencies.
3The data are quarterly observations for the period 1991:4 through 2002:4. We detrend the data by
applying the HP lter. For reference we have also include a detrended (log) levels (di¤erent scale) of real
GDP. Finally, we use border patrol apprehensions of undocumented immigrants as a proxy for the ow of
illegal immigrants into the United States.
4Although our paper and results most closely emulated those of BGS, they also depend on the general-
ization of BGS found in Keister (1998).
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have access to a market in which state-contingent securities are traded and use this market
to partially insure against price level uncertainty, and hence consumption volatility. Tax rev-
enues are distributed between two government activities: border enforcement and transfers
to migrant workers. Since the only uncertainty in this economy stems from the commodity
price of money being unknown, all uncertainty in our model is extrinsic in nature.5
Some individuals born in the home country may choose to emigrate, spending a fraction
of their time working in the home country and the rest crossing the border (evading enforce-
ment) and working in the host country. Home-country workers are unskilled. In addition to
wage income, migrant workers receive benets from the host-country transfer program (i.e.,
education and health services). In addition to potential migrants, a fraction of the home
country population are engaged in people smuggling. Smugglers are endowed with some
knowledge of border enforcement techniques and divide their labor time between acquiring
additional information regarding border patrols and arranging for border crossings. Migrants
who use the services of smugglers spend less time crossing the border and more time working
in the host country.
Finally, individuals born in the home country do not have access to state-contingent
securities markets in the host country. They represent the restricted set of individuals who
are assumed to be born after the realization of the sunspot. As has been shown in previous
literature, participation can matter for equilibria allocations under extrinsic uncertainty.6
Our results are easily summarized. First, we show that sunspot equilibria exist in this
economy. Moreover, the sunspot equilibria are not mere randomizations of certainty equi-
libria. Second, we classify two sources of potential volatility which help to explain uctu-
ations in migration that are neither wage driven nor dependent on networks. Specically,
we derive conditions under which there exist multiple (two), non-sunspot equilibria in this
economy, and hence, potential uctuations in migration. There are two distinct sources of
this volatility. One involves coordinating on a particular equilibria. In other words, there is
no coordination mechanism that prevents the economy from switching between equilibria, for
5For a more complete discussion of extrinsic uncertainty, see Cass and Shell (1983) and Balasko (1983).
Also related, Balasko and Shell (1986) study an overlapping-generations model in which lump-sum taxes and
transfers are present.
6See Cass and Shell (1983), Woodford (1986), Cass (1992), Balasko and Shell (1993) for a thorough
development of the role of limited participation on uctuations in stationary sunspot equilibria.
3
a given realization of the sunspot. In addition, the two states of nature associated with the
sunspot o¤ers another source of volatility to the migration pattern as additional equilibria
exist. Third, we consider the e¤ects that a change in transfer payments (or conversely taxes)
would have on equilibrium outcomes. As expected, the exact impact of policy changes is
highly dependent on which equilibrium and which state of nature prevails.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. The basic model is outlined in Section
2. Section 3 denes a sunspot equilibria and shows existence of pure sunspot equilibria
while Section 4 describes the equilibrium values for the level of migration and quantity of
smugglers services. We obtain the comparative static results in Section 5. Section 6 o¤ers a
brief summary and conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider a world consisting of two countries: a home country, from which individuals
may choose to emigrate, and a host country, to which individuals illegally immigrate and
from which there is no emigration. The economies of both countries are characterized by a
standard two-period lived, overlapping generations model with production.7 Time is discrete
and indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::: For every date t  1, there are N individuals born in both
the host and home countries, where N is assumed to be nite and greater than or equal to
two.8 All individuals, regardless of their country of origin, are identical with respect to their
preferences and time endowments; they are endowed with one unit of labor time when young
and nothing when old, and value only old age consumption. Individuals di¤er with respect
to skill levels, as discussed below.
We also introduce extrinsic uncertainty (i.e., sunspots) into the model economy. It is
assumed that all taxes and transfers are denominated in nominal units, which for simplicity,
we will refer to as dollars. The goods price of these dollars, , is assumed to be sunspot
7As will be detailed below, production in both economies will be labor only (i.e., no capital required)
and wages are xed. Alternatively, one can reinterpret our economy as an endowment economy where the
amount of the endowment received depends on the quantity of time spent in a respective country.
8There is no loss in generality by assuming that the populations of the two countries are identical. In
addition, we could also assume a continuum of individuals with unit mass in both countries. A nite number
of individuals is assumed solely for expository convenience.
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dependent.9 We assume that there are two possible states of nature: s 2 f; g : Thus the
value of a unit of taxes will either be  () or  () depending on which state occurs. Finally,
we assume that the likelihood of state  () occurring is given by the probability  (1  )
respectively.
2.1 Host Country
Individuals born in the host country are distinguished by their skill level. For simplicity,
we assume there are two types of individuals: skilled and unskilled. An individuals skill
level is common knowledge and an indication of their marginal productivity. At each date
t  1, the host-country production technology transforms labor into a single, homogeneous
consumption good and workers are paid their marginal product. In addition, it is assumed
that host-country natives do not migrate.
All host-country workers, regardless of skill level, have access to state-contingent markets
for trading securities prior to the realization of the state, s and spot markets for trading
goods after the realization of state s: The former allows all host country workers the ability
to (partially) insure themselves against the uncertainty regarding the future state of nature.
2.1.1 Skilled Workers Problem
A fraction " of individuals within any given host-country generation are highly skilled work-
ers. These individuals live for two periods and inelastically supply their one unit of labor
when young. They earn a xed wage !H .10 In addition, they also face a lump-sum tax, Ht ;
which is denominated in dollars and which, in real terms, cannot exceed the income earned
by the worker. Thus, the value of these taxes in state s; is given by t (s) 
H
t : Individuals also
have the opportunity to buy and sell state-contingent claims.11 Since only old-age consump-
tion is valued, individuals save their entire wage income net of taxes and any state contingent
9We follow Shell (1977), Cass and Shell (1983), Bhattacharya et al. (1998), Keister (1998), etc. in having
the sunspot dependent variable be the price of money.
10Alternatively, one can interpret this as an endowment economy where some individuals (high-skilled)
receive a large endowment while others (low-skilled) receive a smaller endowment.
11One can think of individuals as issuing IOUs which are contingent upon whether state  or  prevails.
We restrict individuals to having an overall non-negative position with respect to the total value of IOUs
issued across the two states of nature.
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securities in the form of a simple storage technology, which yields  units of consumption in
period t+1 for every unit of savings at t. Thus we can write the skilled workers problem as
max
cHt+1();c
H
t+1()
U
 
cHt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cHt+1 () (SHP)
subject to


pt ()!
H   pmt () Ht

+ 

pt ()!
H   pmt () Ht

= pt () c
H
t+1 () + p

t () c
H
t+1 ()
where pt is the price of the consumption good and p
m
t is the price of money. The price of the
host-country consumption good is strictly positive while the price of money is nonnegative.
It is useful to represent the host-country individuals resources available for consumption
after taxes. We dene the tax-adjusted endowment, !H ; by
pt (s) !
H = pt (s)!
H   pmt (s) Ht = pt (s)

!H   p
m
t (s)
pt (s)
Ht

where
pmt (s)
pt (s)
= t (s)
is the goods price of money. The skilled workers problem can be rewritten as
max
cHt+1();c
H
t+1()
U
 
cHt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cHt+1 ()
subject to

pt () !
H + pt () !
H

 = pt () c
H
t+1 () + p

t () c
H
t+1 () :
As written, the individuals budget constraint is properly interpreted as workers having
unrestricted access to the state-contingent claims markets. Bhattacharya et al. (1998), in
their appendix, show the equivalence between the above formulation of an individuals budget
constraint and ones where these individuals trade on spot markets and other contingent
commodity markets and/or contingent money markets.
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2.1.2 Unskilled Workers Problem
A fraction 1  " of individuals within any given host-country native generation are unskilled
(or low-skilled) workers. Individuals live for two periods and inelastically supply their one
unit of labor when young. They earn a xed wage !L. In addition, they also face a lump-
sum tax, Lt ; which is denominated in dollars. Thus, the value of these taxes in state s; is
given by t (s) 
L
t : As with the skilled workers, unskilled workers also have the opportunity
to participate in state-contingent claims markets. Since only old-age consumption is valued,
individuals save their entire wage income net of taxes and any state contingent securities in
the form of a simple storage technology, which yields  units of consumption in period t+1
for every unit of savings at t. Thus we can write the skilled workers problem as
max
cLt+1();c
L
t+1()
U
 
cLt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cLt+1 () (UHP)
subject to

pt ()!
L   pmt () Lt

+

pt ()!
L   pmt () Lt

 = pt () c
L
t+1 () + p

t () c
L
t+1 () :
It will again be useful to represent the host-country individuals resources available for con-
sumption after taxes. We dene the tax-adjusted endowment, !L; by
pt (s) !
L = pt (s)!
L   mt (s) Lt = pt (s)

!L   p
m
t (s)
pt (s)
Lt

:
The unskilled workers problem can thus be rewritten as
max
cLt+1();c
L
t+1()
U
 
cLt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cLt+1 ()
subject to

pt () !
L + pt () !
L

 = pt () c
L
t+1 () + p

t () c
L
t+1 () :
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2.1.3 Government Problem
The host-country government engages in three related activities: collecting taxes, enforcing
the border, and providing basic services to illegal immigrants. Taxes are collected from both
skilled and unskilled workers from the host countries. These funds are then used to provide
basic services for illegal immigrants and to fund the desired level of border enforcement,
denoted by et. We assume that the level of service provided to illegal immigrants, a; is
constant (on a per person basis) over time but that the quantity of services received in total
depends on the fraction of time that immigrants spend getting to and working in the host
country, T () :12 In addition we assume that the government runs a balanced budget. Thus
the governments budget constraint is given by
t (s)

"Ht + (1  ") Lt

= T (t) t (s) a+ et (1)
for s = ; . The properties of the transfer-proportion function are described in detail when
we discuss the migrants maximization problem.
2.2 Home Country
The home country is characterized by two classes of individuals: migrants and smugglers.
All individuals are assumed to be born after the state of nature has been realized, and
thus, home country individuals represent the class of restricted participants in our model.13
Smugglers work only in the smuggling industry while migrants divide their time between
home production, crossing the border, and host-country production. Migrant production
12The idea is that all illegal immigrants consume some government-provided goods and services. Migrants
who are caught crossing the border are provided basic services at detention centers and are returned home
at government expense. Migrants who successfully cross the border receive services such as education and
emergency health care even though they are usually not eligible for welfare or most other assistance pro-
grams. For simplicity, we assume the government provided goods are perfect substitutes for the consumption
good and that they are transformed at a one-for-one rate. Finally, although amount of time crossing the
border and working is denoted by 1 , we have chosen to dene T in terms of  for expositional e¢ ciency.
13Although we do not address it in this paper, one could also conceive of a model where home country
individuals are born prior to the realization of the sunspot but are restricted from participating in contingent-
claims markets due to geographical restrictions. In this case migrants and smugglers would most likely
attempt to self-insure against the sunspot via their choice of time allocations (i.e., fraction of time spent in
each country and fraction of time devoted to learning about enforcement respectively.)
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in the home country is characterized by a labor only production process. It is assumed
that migrants produce a single homogenous nal good, which is produced and saved in the
migrants rst period of life, and then consumed when old. Finally, all migrant workers are
assumed to be unskilled.
2.2.1 Migrants Problem
A fraction  of individuals within any given home-country generation are potential migrants.
Each generation of migrants is endowed with one unit of labor when young and nothing when
old. There is no initial old generation of migrants. Since only old-age consumption is valued,
this labor is supplied inelastically when young. The migrant must decide what fraction of
her labor time, t; to spend working in the home country and what fraction, 1 t; to spend
crossing the border and working in the foreign country. However, merely deciding to go
and work in the host country does not guarantee that the migrant will be successful in her
attempt(s) to cross the border. Thus, the fraction of time spent emigrating from the home
country, 1 , is further divided into two activities; time spent actually working in the host
country M () and time spent crossing the border, 1 M ().
The amount of time used in crossing the border depends on the level of border enforce-
ment implemented by the host country, et; and the amount of services, qt; a migrant obtains
from smugglers. Thus, the amount of time spent working in the host country is a fraction
of the time allotment not spent working in the home country; that is, M (qt; et) (1  t),
where 0  M (qt; et)  1.14 Conversely, the time lost crossing the border is given by
[1 M (qt; et)] (1  t). The level of border enforcement, et; is taken as given by the mi-
grant. It is assumed that if et = 0; then there is no border enforcement and M (qt; 0) = 1
for all qt  0:15 In addition we assume that 0 > Me >  1: Thus, an increase in the level of
enforcement reduces the amount of time spent working in the host country.
Since crossing the border is time consuming, smugglers exist to reduce the crossing time.
At date t; migrants can purchase a quantity qt of smuggling services, taking the price, pt,
as given; where pt is measured in units of the home-country production good. It is assumed
14We dene e; q; and M to lie inside the unit interval. Thus, M : [0; 1] [0; 1]! [0; 1] :
15Open borders correspond to perfect labor mobility.
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that the greater the quantity of smuggling services obtained, the less time is used to cross the
border, that is,Mq > 0; and that there are decreasing returns to additional units of smuggling
services, Mqq < 0. In addition, it is assumed that Mq <1 and 0 < M (0; et; )  1:16
Migrants who work in the home country earn a xed wage ! per unit of time spent
in home production.17 Any income not spent on smuggling services is saved via a simple
storage technology in the home country. For every unit of output saved at time t; the migrant
receives one unit of consumption good at date t+1: Migrants who are successful in crossing
the border earn a xed wage !L in the host country and save in the host country via the
same storage method as in the home country.18 In addition, the migrant receives transfer
payments, at, denominated in dollars, from the host country government. The quantity of
dollars received is assumed to be proportional to the quantity of time spent crossing the
border and working in the host country, captured by T (t). We assume that T lies in the
unit interval (i.e., T : [0; 1] ! [0; 1]) and possesses the following properties: T (0)  1,
T (1) = 0, T 0 (t) < 0; T
00 (t) < 0.
19 Thus the total, goods value of transfer payments is
given by T (t) t (s) at:
Finally, unlike the workers in the host-country, migrants are born after the realization of
the sunspot and are not able to trade on contingent claims market. We additionally assume
that migrants spend their retirement in the host country.
We can formally write the migrants problem as
max
t;qt
U (ct+1 (s)) (MWP)
16The latter assumption implies that even without the aid of the smuggler, a migrant will eventually cross
the border and spend some time working in the host country.
17Alternatively, one can think of ! as an endowment which the migrant receives continuously throughout
his young period life. Thus, if the migrant choose to stay in the home country for  fraction of his young
life, then she will receive only ! of the total endowment possible.
18It is assumed that migrants are low skilled and thus enter that segment of job market paying lower wages,
!L: We assume that this wage is xed and thus think of this as a minimum wage earned by all low skilled
workers in the host country. Alternatively, one can also think of this as an endowment earned by migrants
in the host country which will be dependent on the fraction of time actually spent in the host country.
19Although the time spent crossing the border and working in the host country is given by 1   t; given
that t lies in the unit interval it is immaterial whether we dene T () as a function of t or 1   t: In
addition, despite the technical nature of these assumptions, the intuition behind them is quite reasonable.
If T () satises these conditions, then illegal immigrants obtain most of their transfers (total, goods value
of social services) after rst arriving in the host-country and then government provided services decline with
duration of stay (assimilation).
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subject to
ct+1 = !t   ptqt +

!LM (qt; et) [1  t] + T (t) t (s) at
	

and
!t  ptqt
0  t  1
for s 2 f; g. First order conditions yield the set of equations
! =

!LM (qt; et)  T 0 (t) att (s)
	
 (2)
pt = !
L (1  t)Mq (qt; et) : (3)
Equation (2) indicates the trade-o¤ associated with migrating; the income (wage) earned
per unit of time in the home country must equal the income earned per unit of time in the
host-country (the sum of the wages in the host country and transfer payments). Equation (3)
indicates that the marginal cost of the smuggling service is equal to the marginal income gain
from using smuggling services, where the marginal gain in time working in the host-country
labor market is measured by the product Mq (qt; et) (1  t). We assume that U (ct+1) sat-
ises all the standard conditions necessary for an interior solution; namely U (0) = 0 and
U 0 (ct+1) > 0:
2.2.2 Smugglers Problem
In each generation, a fraction, 1   , of the home-country population are smugglers. Like
migrants, smugglers live for two periods. In contrast, smugglers are restricted to producing
smuggling services and may not migrate or work in the home-country production sector.
When young, smugglers are endowed with one unit of labor that they supply inelastically.
As with migrants, smugglers value only old age consumption and are retired when old.
Thus they consume the gross return from investing their savings in the same simple storage
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technology as migrants. Finally, there exists an initial old generation of smugglers who
possess smuggling capital h0.
A smugglers unit of labor is divided between two activities when young: accumulating
smuggling capital (research and development), at; and selling border crossings. For a smug-
gler, these operations are ordered sequentially; that is, the young smuggler rst accumulates
smuggling capital by crossing people, then begins selling services. We think of smuggling
capital as the knowledge of methods and means for circumventing host-country border en-
forcement. The smuggler uses the remaining time endowment to arrange border crossings.
We let dt represent the fraction of time which smugglers devote to accumulating smuggling
capital and (1  dt) be the fraction of time devoted to arranging crossings.20
When determining the amount of time to devote to accumulating smuggling capital in
period t, we assume that the quantity of smuggling capital (knowledge) previously acquired
by all past generations, ht 1; is available to the current generations of smugglers; that is,
there is no depreciation of smuggling capital. We let the function g (dt; ht 1) represent the
process by which time devoted to capital accumulation is transformed into smugglers capital.
Thus we have
ht = g (dt; ht 1) (4)
where 0  dt  1: We assume that g (dt; ht 1) has the following properties: gd and gh > 0
and gdd and ghh < 0. Let g (0; ht 1) = 0; that is, a smuggler must devote some time to
actually smuggling people over the border in order to develop knowledge about e¤ective
crossing methods and techniques. Finally, we assume that for dt > 0; gh (dt; 0) > 1: Thus,
taking the time to accumulate smuggler capital pays bigger dividends when there exists little
smuggler capital from previous generations.
20One can think of the smugglers rst period as divided into two distinct subperiods. The initial subperiod
of his young life is spent as an apprentice to an old smuggler, who has institutional knowledge about crossing
and enforcement. In this subperiod, the smuggler undertakes the actual process of crossing migrants over
the border. While the apprenticeship provides no income, it provides the required knowledge to make
income-generating arrangements for migrant crossings during the second subperiod.
This is not unlike arrangements smugglers currently make on the U.S.-Mexican border. In practice,
apprentice smugglers run the migrants across until they have been caught so many times (usually ten)
that they risk prosecution if caught again. They then become coordinators and recruiters charged with
getting clients for the new generation of runners. For more information on how smugglers operate, see
Spener (2002).
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The smuggler arranges migration services in a perfectly competitive environment. As
such, the representative smuggler takes the price of smuggling services, pt, as given. In
addition, the smuggler also takes as given the level of enforcement, et; in period t: Finally,
it is only the process of arranging for migrant crossings that generates income. To produce
migration services, the smuggler must devote su¢ cient time to capital accumulation, so that
he may overcome the anticipated level of enforcement. Formally, let the quantity of migration
services supplied be given by
Qt = B [ht   et] (1  dt) for ht  et (5)
= 0 otherwise and
where B > 0 is a constant scale factor, ht   et is the e¤ectiveness of the smuggling methods
relative to enforcement methods, and 1 dt is the fraction of time devoted to selling migration
services.
We can therefore write the smugglers maximization problem as
max
dt
U
 
cct+1

(CP)
subject to the constraints
cct+1 = ptB [ht   et] (1  dt) ; and
ht = g (dt; ht 1)
ht  et;
where cc denotes consumption by the smuggler. Given the interior solution guaranteed by
the properties of the utility function, the e¢ ciency condition for the smuggler is
ptB fgd (dt; ht 1) (1  dt)  [g (dt; ht 1)  et]g = 0 (6)
Equation (6) describes the smugglers trade-o¤. The rst term inside the brackets repre-
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sents the marginal gain from capital accumulation while the second term inside the brackets
represents the marginal cost of time allocated to capital accumulation  time not spent
arranging migration services.
3 Existence of Sunspot Equilibria
Before focusing on existence and properties of the equilibrium values for migration, smuggler
services, etc., it will be useful to establish the existence of sunspot equilibria. Establishing
this result requires only examining equilibrium consumption allocations for host-country
individuals. This is the result of the fact that skilled and unskilled host-country workers
will insure themselves, via trade in contingent-claims markets, prior to the realization of the
sunspot and that, migrants, who enter the host country after the state of nature has been
revealed, cannot participate in these markets and thus will merely consume the proceeds
from their work. Thus, the existence of sunspots (and in particular sunspot equilibria which
are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria) is strictly a matter of examining the
equilibrium allocations of host-country workers.21 Given this, and the fact that the setup
of host-country workers is almost identical to the unrestricted agents in Bhattacharya et al.
(1998), their results (from section 3.3) are directly applicable to our economy. Hence we now
focus on dening equilibrium in the host-country.
A host-country competitive equilibrium for the sunspot economy must satisfy the follow-
ing
Denition 1 A sunspot equilibrium consists of: (i) a sequence of allocations by the host-
country workers,

cHt () ; c
H
t () ; c
L
t () ; c
L
t ()
	1
t=0
,that satises problems (SHP) and
(UHP); (ii) a price vector, fpmt () ; pmt () ; pt () ; pt ()g1t=0, that clears the host-country
goods market; and (iii) for some t; either cHt () 6= cHt () or cLt () 6= cLt ().
As in Bhattacharya et al. (1998) we assume a log utility function and at least one unre-
21We are thus following the structure and methods developed in Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and Keister
(1998) to verify the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria. As Bhattacharya et al. (1998) point out,
"...equilibrium in this economy reduces to the determination of equilibrium in a smaller economy with no
restrictions on market participation but...in which uncertainty is intrinsic."
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stricted individual to have no tax burden.22 For ease of exposition, we also assume that taxes,
for both high and low skilled workers, are time independent, i.e., Ht = 
H and Lt = 
L:
Given these assumptions, we can show the following.
Proposition 1 There exist equilibria in which sunspots a¤ect the consumption of host coun-
try workers if and only if H + L 6= 0: There will exist sunspot equilibria whenever t () 6=
t () :
The results follow directly from Proposition 2 in Keister (1998). The basic intuition is that
for t () 6= t () (an assumption we make), the tax adjusted Edgeworth box is not square.
Because equilibrium consumption bundles will lie on the diagonal of the Edgeworth box, it
follows that consumption will not be identical across the two states of nature.
Proposition 2 There exist sunspot equilibria which are not mere randomizations over the
certainty equilibria.
This result is proved in Proposition 3.1 in Bhattacharya et al. (1998). Their result is proved
by setting L = 0: Thus, the unskilled host-country workers in the certainty economy face
no taxes and would merely eat their endowment (savings in our model). Any randomization
over the certainty economy would require that unskilled native workers consume only their
endowment (savings). However, in the sunspot economy they would choose to insure against
the sunspot  thus not consuming their endowment (savings) and the resulting equilibrium
would not be a randomization over the certainty economy.
Remark: Taken together, these propositions have interesting implications regarding the
impact of immigrants (or any new, younger job entrant) on unskilled (older), native workers.
Specically, they highlight the fact that any detrimental impact to unskilled workers is not
the result of immigrants but rather is the result of choices made by unskilled workers in the
face of uncertain future tax burdens. Consider the unskilled workers consumption. With
L = 0, it follows immediately that in the absence of a market in which state-contingent
22Keister (1998) shows that in a one period setup, which is essentially what we have, that the results which
follow hold for more general specications of the utility function. The following proposition is based on this
generalization.
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securities are traded, this unskilled worker would simply consume her savings. Proposition
2 implies that access to a market trading state-contingent securities results in consumption
of the unskilled worker varying with the state of nature.23
Most importantly, this variance of consumption (well-being) does not depend on the usual
story in which low-skilled workers su¤er wage reductions because of the inow of migrant
workers. Here the wages for low-skilled workers are constant. Consequently, the variance
stems from the at redistribution scheme (taxes and transfers) and the ex ante incentive
to participate in the market trading state-contingent securities. In short, unskilled workers
payfor the (preferred) redistribution scheme even though their explicit tax burden is zero.
In our setting, the trade-o¤ between ex ante e¢ cient participation and ex post variance is a
by-product of the sunspot, restricted participation, and the monetary redistribution scheme
and not the presence of migrant (new) workers.
4 Migration and Smuggling Equilibria
The uncertainty over the state of nature, and the resulting existence of sunspot equilibria,
also a¤ects the equilibrium levels of migration, smuggling services, and smugglersallocation
of time. Although individuals in the home-country are restricted from participating in con-
tingent claims markets, their decisions regarding allocation of time and the level of smuggler
services to acquire, will di¤er depending on which state of nature, s; prevails. We begin
by rst discussing some properties of enforcement and smuggling in equilibrium. We then
describe the equilibrium laws of motion governing the system and state conditions under
which multiple equilibria will exists. Finally we end this section by examining the impact
of sunspots on the equilibrium values of migration, smuggler services and smugglerstime
allocation decision.
23Bhattacharya et al. (1998) use the term volatility to refer to the range of equilibrium allocations and
prices we are referring to as variation in consumption. Formally,

cLt () ; c
L
t ()

is a proper subset of <++
and has positive measure because cLt () 6= cLt (). In contrast,

cLt (st)

is a singleton and therefore is a
measure zero set when the low-skilled worker has access to the market for state-contingent securities.
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4.1 Enforcement and Smugglers
It will be useful to rst describe the smugglers decision on how to allocate her time, dt;
between capital accumulation and arranging border crossings. The choice of dt depends on
the level of enforcement, which is given by equation (1), and can be written as
et = t (s)

"H + (1  ") L   T (t) a

(7)
for s = ; : As with the taxes paid by host-country workers, we assume that the marginal
dollar value of transfers received by migrants is time invariant  at = a: Thus, we can
rewrite this expression as et = e
  t; H ; L; a; t (s) ; ";  : The following lemma states
selected properties about the level of enforcement.
Lemma 1 a) e > 0; b) e

 > 0; c) e

 > 0; and d) e

a < 0:
These results follow directly from simply di¤erentiating equation (7) and hence a proof is
omitted. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Parts (a) through (c) state
that if transfers decrease (because migrants spend more time in the home-country), the goods
value of dollars increase, or taxes increase, ceteris paribus, then there will be greater funds
available for enforcement. Part (d) says that an increase in the dollar value of transfers will
decrease the funds available for enforcement for a given level of tax revenue.
From equation (6), one obtains
gd (dt (s) ; ht 1) (1  dt (s))  g (dt (s) ; ht 1) =  et: (8)
Using equation (8) and the implicit function theorem we can solve for the fraction of time
smugglers spend acquiring smuggling capital, dt = d
  t; H ; L; a; ht 1; t (s) : We derive
the e¤ect of changes in several variables of interest on the time allotted for research activity
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 a) d > 0; b) d

 > 0; c) d

 > 0; d) d

a < 0 and e) for gh > gdh; then d

ht 1 < 0
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The results of Lemma 2 follow directly from di¤erentiating equation (8).24 The rst three
results (Parts (a)-(c)) are tantamount to increasing enforcement and part (d) is equivalent to
decreasing enforcement and thus is the converse of the rst three parts. An increase in border
enforcement results in the smuggler allocating greater time to research and development in
order to overcome the greater level of enforcement. Finally, an increase in the amount
of prior smuggler capital (Part (e)) will lead to less research and development since the
marginal payo¤ to additional e¤ort is lower. In e¤ect, with an increase in accumulated
knowledge the young smugglers are reaping the rewards from research e¤orts undertaken by
previous generations.
We use the results of Lemma 2 to characterize the e¤ect that changes in enforcement
on the equilibrium quantity of smuggling services, q. Recall that the quantity of smuggler
service supplied was given by
Qt = B [ht   et] (1  dt)
= B

ht   e
 
t; 
H ; L; a; t (s) ; "; 
  
1  d  t; H ; L; a; ht 1; t (s) :
Thus, in equilibrium market clearing implies that
qt = (1  )B [ht   et ] (1  dt ) ; (9)
or rewriting this equation and letting qt be the equilibrium quantity of services
qt =
(1  )B

[ht   et ] (1  dt )
Rewriting this using equation (4) we obtain
qt =
(1  )B

f[g (dt)  et ] [1  dt ]g : (10)
Applying the implicit function theorem yields qt = q
  t; ht 1; H ; L; a; t (s) ; "; . The
properties of q with respect to key variables are described in the following lemma.
24This result is analogous to Lemma 2 in Guzman et al. (2001).
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Lemma 3 a) q < 0; b) q

 < 0 c) q

 < 0; d) q

a > 0, and e) q

ht 1 > 0:
The results of Lemma 3 follow directly from di¤erentiating equation (10) and applying
the results of Lemma (2).25 The intuition is as follows. For parts (a)-(c), changes in ; ; and
 lead to greater enforcement, which leads to less smuggling activity, as smugglers devote
greater time to learning about these new enforcement levels and thus less time actually
arranging for crossings. Thus, these 3 parts of Lemma 3 are capturing the e¤ect that a
change in border patrol has on the quantity of smuggling services through the e¤ect on the
smugglers time allocation. Part (d) is merely the reverse as greater transfers lead to less
enforcement and thus more smuggling activity. For a given level of enforcement, smugglers
with a higher level of accumulated knowledge (smugglers capital) part (e) will choose to
arrange for a greater number of illegal border crossings.
4.2 Equilibrium Laws of Motion
We can now condense the equilibria of this economy down to two equations (laws of motion).
We can rewrite equation (10) as
qt =
(1  )B

fg (dt ; ht 1)  eg [1  dt ] ; (11)
where the long list of arguments in dt and e

t are omitted for ease of exposition. The second
equilibrium condition comes from the migrants maximization problem and is given by
!

= !LM [qt ; e

t ]  T 0 (t ) t (s) a (12)
To prove existence of and ascertain the number of equilibria, it will be useful to know the
properties of the above two equations. First, from Lemma (3), we know that di¤erentiating
equation (11) with respect to the level of migration, ; yields
dq
d
= e
(1  )

B f  (1  dt )g < 0:
25See Guzman et al. (2001), Lemma 3.
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Thus, equation (11) is downward sloping in (; q) space. It will be important when analyzing
the impact of sunspots on the volatility of migration to know whether this equation is
concave, convex, or some combination of the two. To simplify our analysis we henceforth
make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (A.1) Let the function T () be such that for 0    1 and 0  q; then
T 0 (t)
T 00 (t)
>
1  dt
d
:
This assumption on the curvature of the function T () guarantees that equation (11) is
convex, as represented in Figures 2 and 3.26
Next, di¤erentiating equation (12), we obtain
0 = !L

Mq
dq
d
+Mee



  T 00 (t ) t (s) a:
Rearranging terms yields
dq
d
=
T 00t(s)a
!L  Mee
Mq
=
at (s)
Mq!L
 
T 00 + !LMeT 0

:
The sign of dq /d depends on the sign of T 00+!LMeT 0. Recall that we assumed that T 0 ()
and T 00 () were both negative and Me < 0. We further make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 (A.2) : The functions M (q; e) and T () are such that they satisfy the
following conditions for 0   and 0  q:
i) Meq =Mqe > 0 and Mee  0;
ii) T 000 () 2 ( ";1)
Finally, let (; q) represent the locus of points which satisfy the following
iii) T 00 ()

!L =  Me (q; e ()) T 0 ()
26The propositions which follow in the next few sections and the analysis of comparative statics is, of
course, dependent on whether equation (11) is concave, convex, or contains (multiple) points of inection.
However, the propositions (and analysis) which follow can be straight-forwardly modied based on the
curvature properities of equation (11). Hence we focus only on the convex case for equation (11).
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The rst two parts of this assumption guarantee that part (iii) denes a upward sloping locus
of points (; q) : For combinations of  and q which lie below this locus we have dq /d < 0
and for (; q) combinations above this locus close we have dq /d > 0: Thus equation (12)
has the general hill-shape depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
4.2.1 Existence of Equilibria
Existence of equilibria requires that a) equations (11) and (12) intersect and that b) and
equilibrium pair (; q) satisfy the conditions that 0    1 and 0  q: Although
there are a myriad of di¤erent su¢ cient conditions one could state that would guarantee
the existence of a unique equilibria (or none at all), we restrict ourselves to studying the
cases under which two equilibria exist. Prior to stating necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for multiple equilibria, it will be useful to make the following denitions, some depicted in
Figure 4.
Denition 2 Let   and + be the values of  such that both ( ; 0) and (+; 0) satisfy
equation (12), where   < +.
Denition 3 Let max = min [+; 1] ; and let qmax be dened such that equation (12) holds
at (max; qmax) ; i.e.
!

= !LM [qmax; e (max)]  T 0 (max) t (s) a:
Denition 4 Let min = max [ ; 0] ; and let qmin be dened such that equation (12) holds
at (min; qmin) ; i.e.
!

= !LM [qmin; e (min)]  T 0 (min) t (s) a:
Denition 5 Let (2; q2) represent any values of  and q that satisfy equation (12), that
is
!

= !LM

q2; e
 
2
  T 0  2 t (s) a:
Given these denitions, we now state necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which two
equilibria exist.
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Proposition 3 If there exists a pair (2; q2) such that
i) 0  2  1 and 0  q2 and
ii)
q2 >
(1  )B


g
 
dt
 
2

; ht 1
  e  2 1  dt  2
iii) and if both
qmin  (1  )B

[g (dt (min) ; ht 1)  e (min)] [1  dt (min)]
and
qmax  (1  )B

[g (dt (max) ; ht 1)  e (max)] [1  dt (max)]
then there exists two equilibria: a high-migration, high-smuggler use equilibrium and a low-
migration, low-smuggler use equilibrium.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the two possible situations in which there exist two equilibria.
For the remainder of the paper we focus on these two generic cases with two equilibria.
However, the results which follow below also encompass those situations where a unique
equilibria exists. Finally, we will use the following short-hand notation when referring to the
two possible equilibria: the high level of migration and smuggler service utilization will be
referred to as the high-migration equilibria and the low level of migration and quantity of
smuggler services will be referred to as the low-migration equilibria.
One important point of note is that there exists volatility in migration independent of the
sunspot in this model, as evidenced by Figures 2 and 3  which depict multiple equilibria
within a given state of nature. Because there is no selection mechanism for choosing an
equilibrium and because the model is static from the migrants perspective, at any given date
t; either equilibria is equally likely to prevail and it is possible to switch between the two
equilibria regularly thus generating volatility.
The source of this volatility, as evidenced by Assumption A.2, is the fact that service
obtained by migrants from the government are non-linear (in fact concave) in the quantity
of time spent working in the home country. The net result of this is that at low levels of
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migration, migrants are willing to acquire additional smuggler services because the marginal
return to migrating is su¢ ciently high. However, as migration increases, this results in a
decrease in the level of enforcement, as (made clear in equation (7)) enforcement is merely
the residual of what is left-over from taxes after paying for migrant services. Thus increased
migration lessens the funds available for, and hence level of, enforcement. At some point,
this reduced enforcement will lead to a drop in smuggler services as they are not needed
to overcome the waning enforcement level. Thus the marginal return to migrating is equal
when there is low migration, high enforcement, as when there exists high-migration resulting
in lower levels of enforcement. This existence of multiple equilibria combined with a lack
of a coordinating mechanism implies that it is entirely possible to observe switching (in no
particularly structured way) between equilibria, thus generating a volatile path with respect
to migration ows.
4.2.2 Sunspots and Equilibrium Migration
In addition to the volatility possible as a result of multiple equilibria and no coordinating
mechanism, the sunspot nature of the economy adds another layer of potential volatility to
the level of illegal immigration. The impact of sunspots on equilibrium values often depends
on induced changes in migration ows relative to changes in enforcement. As such, we begin
this section by detailing when changes in equilibrium values are denitive or ambiguous and
then proceed to explain the sources of any ambiguities. Finally, we examine the extent to
which sunspots lead to greater volatility in migration and smuggler services.
Since both equations (11) and (12) depend on  (s) ; the equilibrium levels of migration,
; and quantity of smuggler services, q; will depend on which state of nature, s = ; ;
prevails. Without loss of generality, we henceforth assume that  () >  () : To understand
the impact that a change in the real value of money will have, we examine the relative
positions of equations (11) and (12) as depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for the two states of
nature. We begin by di¤erentiating equations (11) and (12) with respect to  (s) :
Di¤erentiating equation (11) with respect to goods price of money, ; yields
dq
d
< 0:
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Thus, equation (11) has the conguration denoted in Figure ?? for the respective states of
nature s = ; : Similarly, di¤erentiating equation (12) yields
dq
d
=
T 0a
!L  Mee
Mq
:
The impact of an increase in the goods price of money depends on when
T 0a  !LMee T 0: (13)
We restrict ourselves to examining three generic sets of cases regarding equation (13) and
let ( () ; q ()) and ( () ; q ()) denote values of  and q associated with state  and 
respectively.27
Case 1 Suppose that for every pair (; q) satisfying 0    1 and 0  q and equation (12)
that either
T 0a  !LMee > 0 for all 
or
T 0a  !LMee < 0 for all :
Figure 5 depicts the two possible situations when either dq

d
> 0 or dq

d
< 0:When dq

d
> 0
prevails, then at the high-migration equilibria, an increase in  (s) increases the quantity of
migration (lowers ) and the impact on the quantity of smuggler services, q; is ambiguous
(depending on whether equation (11) or (12) shifts more). At the low-migration equilibria, an
increase in  decreases both the quantity of migration and smuggler services. When dq

d
< 0;
then an increase in  (s) has an ambiguous impact on migration in both equilibria. The
quantity of smuggler services decreases in the high-migration equilibria and is ambiguous in
the low-migration equilibria.
Case 2 Suppose that for every pair (; q) satisfying 0    1 and 0  q, one of the
27Although these three sets of cases are not exhaustive of all possibilities, they do provide the general
methodology and explanations needed to look at more specic cases the reader could imagine.
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following conditions prevails:
T 0a  !LMee > 0 for all  < min () and
T 0a  !LMee < 0 for all  > max ()
or
T 0a  !LMee < 0 for all  < min () and
T 0a  !LMee > 0 for all  > max () :
Figure 6 depicts the two possible situations, which amount to shifting equation (12) to the
left or right respectively. As Figure 6 shows, at the high-migration equilibria an increase in
 increases the quantity of migration (lowers ) and the impact on the quantity of smuggler
services, q; is ambiguous. At the low-migration equilibria, an increase in  has an ambiguous
e¤ect on both the level of migration and the quantity of smuggling services. When equation
(12) "shifts right," then at the high-migration equilibrium, the quantity of smuggler services
falls while the impact on migration is ambiguous. At the low-migration equilibrium, both
the quantity of smuggler services and level of migration falls.
Case 3 Suppose that for every pair (; q) satisfying 0    1 and 0  q, one of the
following conditions prevails:
T 0a  !LMee > 0 for all  < min () and for all  > max () and
T 0a  !LMee < 0 for at least one min () <  < max ()
or
T 0a  !LMee < 0 for all  < min () and for all  > max () and
T 0a  !LMee > 0 for at least one min () <  < max () :
Figure 7 depicts the two possible situations. In the rst sub-case (where equation (12)
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attens), an increase in  (s) decreases the quantity of smuggler services while the impact
on migration levels is ambiguous in both equilibria. In the second subcase, the impact on
migration levels is ambiguous for a given increase in  (s) : However, at the high-migration
equilibrium, the quantity of smuggler services will decrease while at the low-migration equi-
librium the impact of smuggler services is ambiguous.
Remark: Although the impact of changes to the goods price of money are not necessarily
clear or consistent across the di¤erent cases, the intuition as to why the results are some-
times ambiguous and asymmetric with respect to the high- and low-migration equilibria is
straightforward. The two key factors driving our results are a) the non-linear (and opposing)
nature of both T () and M (q; e) and b) the fact that enforcement funding is the residual
tax income obtained after paying for migrant services. As equation (7) makes clear, the
level of enforcement varies with the level of migration. Thus a change in the goods price
of taxes and transfers will have di¤erent impacts on enforcement depending on the initial
level of migration. In addition, given the non-linear nature of T () ; the marginal impact of
changes to  (s) are likely to be even more pronounced for di¤erent initial levels of migration.
Thus, the marginal benet of an increase in transfer payments will depend crucially on the
current level of migration. Obviously, this marginal benet can vary signicantly depending
on whether the high or low-migration equilibria prevails.
This benet must be weighed against the costs of an increased goods value of tax revenue
namely greater funds available for enforcement. Greater enforcement increases the time
spent crossing the border; thus e¤ectively decreasing the wage income from migrating. Given
the non-linear nature of M (q; e) ; the marginal impact of a change in enforcement will di¤er
(potentially signicantly) depending on which equilibrium prevailed prior to the change in
the goods price of money. Thus, the impact of a change in  (s) on the high/low-migration
equilibria depends entirely on the relative curvatures of the function T () and M (q; e) :
Most importantly however, when examining Figures 5 - 7 it becomes obvious that only
in vary rare cases will either the level of migration or the quantity of smuggler services (but
neither both) be unchanged when comparing high (low) migration equilibria across the two
states of nature. Thus the introduction of sunspots into the model economy will a¤ect the
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volatility of both migration ows and quantity of smuggler services.28 The source of this
volatility is described above: namely the marginal trade-o¤which occurs between additional
enforcement and migrant services associate with di¤erent goods prices of taxes and transfers.
4.3 Smuggler Capital Evolution
Finally, although the previous section details the properties of the equilibria with respect
to smuggler services and migration, even when q and  maintain an unchanging equilibria
over time the evolution of smuggler capital is not static. This follows from two facts. First,
smuggler capital depends not only on the state variables but also on previously accumulated
smuggler capital. Second the amount of time devoted to acquiring smuggler capital, dt
depends on the level of migration which can take on one of four values depending on
whether the high or low-migration equilibria prevails and whether state  or  is realized.
We start be describing a simple example before generalizing to our more complicated model.
4.3.1 Unchanging Equilibrium and State
Consider the case when the same state of nature, for example ; and when the same equi-
librium, for example high-migration, always prevails. Denote the equilibrium values by
(H () ; qH ()) : For simplicity we will use the notation H to denote this set. The evolu-
tion of smuggler capital is given by
ht = g (dt; ht 1) :
In state , the high-migration equilibrium yields the following smuggler capital accumulation
equation,
ht = g
 
d
 
H () ; 
H ; L; a; ht 1;  ()

; ht 1

= g (d (ht 1) ; ht 1;H)
 ~g (ht 1;H) ;
28In the analytical framework we have, it is not possible to determine the size of this impact on volatility
without specifying simple functional forms for many variables and simulating results on a computer.
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which is a standard rst order di¤erence equation. It is straightforward to show that if
g (d (ht 1) ; ht 1;H) is a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, for example with d
and h having equal shares, then ~g (ht 1;H) is concave and has the following two properties:
~g0 > 0 and ~g00 < 0: Recall from section 2.2.2 that gh (dt;0) > 1 for any dt > 0. In this case, the
di¤erence equation, ht = ~g (ht 1;H) has the shape depicted in Figure ?? and consequently
has a unique steady state level of capital accumulation ~h (H) to which the system converges
regardless of the initial condition h0: Thus, even though the the quantity of migration and
smuggler services provided are unchanging, smugglers will continually adjust the the time
spent accumulating smuggler capital until the quantity of smuggler capital accumulated, h;
and the e¤ort placed into acquiring more capital d; approach the steady state value ~h (H)
and d

~h (H)

: We now turn to the case described in our model: two equilibria and states
of nature.
4.3.2 Two Equilibria and Two States of Nature
The above example holds only for the case when the state of nature, s, and the particular
equilibrium remain constant over time. However, there is nothing to rule out the switching
between states of nature over time as well as between high and low-migration equilibria. In
this case, the level of smuggler capital will not converge to a unique steady state but rather
jump around between the four possible steady states

~h (H) ; ~h (H) ;
~h (L) ; ~h (L)

(one
for each high/low-migration equilibrium and state of nature  or ). Although convergence
of ht to a unique steady state will not occur, it is possible to discuss the bounds between
which all value for ht will eventually lie.
With out loss of generality, let  and  be such that  () >  () : In addition, and
also without loss of generality, we assume that H () < H () < L () < L (),where
H denotes the high-migration equilibrium and L the low-migration equilibrium.29 As before
we let H denote that equilibrium values associated with the high-migration equilibrium
when state  occurs. Thus we have H < H < L < L: The laws of motion for the four
29This particular conhuration corresponds to Figure ??. The lemmas which follow would need to be
appropriately modied to match other congurations. However, regardless of the relative positions of the
laws of motions in the di¤erent states of nature, it will always be the case evolution of smuggler capital will
almost surelybe bounded above and below for su¢ ciently large t:
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equations
ht (sH;L) = ~g (ht 1 (sH;L))
for s = ;  and the two possible equilibria are depicted in Figure ??.
Let h denote the value of smuggler capital such that for a given state and equilibrium,
h = ~g
 
h

: We know the following three facts.
Lemma 4 If h (H)  h0  h (L) ; then for all t > 0; h (H)  ht  h (L) : Thus ht will
cycle between the four ~g (h)s but has and upper and lower bound.
Lemma 5 Suppose h0 < h (H) ; then at date t > 0; with probability  2

1  [p ()]t ; 1 ;
h (H)  ht  h (L) : Thus for su¢ ciently large t; the level of smuggler capital almost
surelywill be bounded by the upper and lower steady states.
Lemma 6 Suppose h0 > h (L) ; then at date t > 0; with probability  2

1  [p ()]t ; 1 ;
h (H)  ht  h (L) : Thus for su¢ ciently large t; the level of smuggler capital almost
surelywill be bounded by the upper and lower steady states.
Thus, although the level of smuggler capital may not converge, it will be bounded above
and below by the steady state h (H) and h (L) respectively. Although our discussion of
volatility has centered on levels of migration, this sections highlights yet another level of
volatility namely in smugglers capital accumulation. Our model would suggest that even
though the levels of migration may vary (between at most four possible levels), the path
of smugglers capital accumulation could be much more erratic and following no particular
pattern. Finally, the next section explores the impact of changes in scal policy of the
equilibrium levels of migration and smuggler services.
5 Comparative Statics: Taxes
Although the government in this model simply collects taxes to make transfers and enforce
the borders, changes in either the taxes collected or the transfers made has an impact on the
equilibria because both indirectly impact the funds available to enforce the border. However,
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as one would expect the impact of changes in taxes or transfers will largely depend on which
equilibrium prevails.
Consider the e¤ect of a change in taxes (on either the skilled or unskilled). Di¤erentiating
equation (11) yields the following expression:
dq
d
=
(1  )

B f[gddee   e ] (1  d)  (g   e) deeg
= e
(1  )

B f[gdde   1] (1  d)  (g   e) deg
= e
(1  )

B f  (1  d)g
< 0:
Note that an increase in taxes has qualitatively the same e¤ect as an increase in the com-
modity price of money. Di¤erentiate equation (12) one obtains
0 = !L

Mq
dq
d
+Mee

dq
d
=
 Mee
Mq
> 0:
Figure ?? depicts the impact of an increase in taxes on the equilibria, for a given state of
nature. There are qualitative di¤erences depending on which equilibria we study. At low-
migration equilibrium, an increase in  , for example, results in a reduction in smuggling
services and a decrease in migration. Conversely, when evaluated at the high-migration
equilibrium, an increase in taxes results in an increase in migration while the e¤ect on the
quantity of smuggling services is ambiguous.
It is not so unusual for the comparative static responses to di¤er. We o¤er some in-
tuition to account for why these di¤erences arise. The common thread between the two
equilibria is simple; an increase in taxes, for example, increases the level of border enforce-
ment. Other things being equal, the increase in border patrol induces less migration. We see
this mechanism operating in the comparative statics evaluated at the low-migration equilib-
rium; workers respond to the reduced incentive to migrate, spend more time in the home
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country, and purchase fewer smuggling services.
The general equilibrium e¤ects are more pronounced in the high-migration equilibrium.
In particular, the migrant workers endogenous response can reduce the level of border en-
forcement. By increasing the amount of time spent in the host country, migrant workers
receive a larger transfer payment. From Part (a) in Lemma (1), border enforcement is
inversely related to workers time spent in host country. Thus, migrant workers have an
incentive to increase the level of migration. Indeed, this incentive to increase migration is
the dominant force operating in our analysis of the tax e¤ect evaluated at the high-migration
equilibrium. Along with the increased incentive to migrate, there is additional incentive to
purchase smuggling services. Our results indicate that we cannot infer which of the two
countervailing e¤ects dominate. Hence, the total e¤ect on equilibrium quantity of smuggling
services is ambiguous when evaluated at the high-migration equilibrium.30
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a two-country model with one-way migration. The destination
country uses an interdiction policy  a border patrol  to inhibit this movement. It
is natural to interpret such cross-country migration as illegal immigration. Further, we
introduce smuggling services into the model economy to provide a market solution that
assists migrant workers in their e¤orts to circumvent the border patrol.
The key contribution of this paper is to account for uctuations in the ow of illegal
immigrants in the face of constant wage di¤erentials. In contrast to earlier papers that have
stressed network externalities, we o¤er two source for the endogenous uctuations. Under
our setup, we derive conditions under which the presence of sunspots result in equilibria that
are not mere randomizations over the certainty equilibria. The importance of this nding is
that endogenous uctuations can account for volatility in illegal immigration ows in the face
of constant wage di¤erentials. As such, our results o¤er an alternative view to the network
30Essentially, Part (c) versus Part (a) in Lemma (3).
Note that the same intuition applies if we consider an increase in marginal rate of nominal transfer
payments, a. For the sake of saving space, we omit the analysis in the paper. We make this result available
upon request.
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externality hypothesis.
Another advantage to our approach is that we introduce the sunspot as impacting the
value of transfer payments (or services) o¤ered to illegal immigrants and to the intensity of
border enforcement. Thus, unlike the network externality approach, our approach develops
a direct link between policy variables and the volatility in illegal immigration. Both transfer
payments and border patrol are frequently discussed when policymakers debate e¤orts aimed
at changing the ow of illegal immigration. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper in which
these policy variables play a central role in a¤ecting the uctuations.
Finally, we consider a case in which there are two equilibria. Because we are essentially
dealing with a static decision problem, the two equilibria add another layer of endogenous
uctuations to the layer already associated with the sunspot. In other words, the model
economy shows that one source of endogenous uctuation owes to the existence of the sunspot
while another contributing factor is the equilibria  the high-migration or the low-migration
 on which migrant workers coordinate. We do not address the coordination issue in this
paper as it pertains to the equilibrium selection mechanism, but simply point out that an
added degree of endogenous volatility could be contributing to volatility observed in the
illegal immigration data.
There is much room for further research in this model. One issue that deserves attention
is to formulate this model with physical capital so that dynamics could be formally devel-
oped and the implications studied. This may provide one avenue to resolving the lack of a
coordinating mechanism which is generating some of the volatility in our model. Addition-
ally, allowing the migrants and smugglers to be born prior to the realization of the sunspot,
but restricting them from participating in state-contingent markets due to geographical lim-
itations, is likely to have interesting implications. In particular, one could conjecture that
both migrants and smugglers would attempt to self-unsure by means of their choice of time
spent working at home and time spent accumulation capital respectively. This would likely
eliminate volatility in migrant ows and smuggler services and result in volatility resulting
only from coordination problems.
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Figure 1: Volatility: Detrended Apprehension and GDP
Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria with High and Low Migration Levels
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Figure 3: Multiple Equilibria with Low and Lower Migration Levels
Figure 4: One Possible Depiction of Denitions 2, 3, and 4
36
Figure 5: Equation (12) shifts up (down) as a result of an increase in the goods price of
money
Figure 6: Equation (12) shifts left (right) as a result of an increase in the goods price of
money
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Figure 7: Equation (12) attens (elongates) as a result of an increase in the goods price of
money
Figure 8: Smuggler Capital Evolution with one state and one equilibrium
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Figure 9: Smuggler Capital Evolution with multiple states and equilibria
Figure 10: Increase in Taxes Paid
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